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2013-11-07 La TSLR alla 5° conferenza UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications Stampa E-mail

La Turin School of Local Regulation ha partecipato alla 5° edizione della conferenza UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications che si è tenuta a Lisbona dal 7 al 9 novembre 2013.
Franco Becchis, Direttore Scientifico della TSLR, ha presentato il paper  "Helping the Poor as a Non Cooperative Game" scritto insieme a Paolo Cermelli, docente di Modelli matematici presso l'Università degli Studi di Torino.

The Turin School of Local Regulation participated to the 5th edition of the conference UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications held in Lisbon from the 7th to the 9th of November.
Franco Becchis, Scientific Director of the TSLR, presented a paper titled "Helping the Poor as a Non Cooperative Game" co-authored with Paolo Cermelli, Professor of Matemathical Modelling at the University of Torino.

Abstract
The paper should be regarded with respect to the debate on policy answers to poverty in the context of an escalating welfare crisis. In particular, the attention is devoted to a fresh rethinking on the way money is used to help the poor and the disadvantaged in developed countries with conditional schemes.
The paper presents a game between a giver and a recipient of welfare benefits with conditions attached, showing that a particular institutional setting of giver's goals could misalign incentives and hinder conditionality in term of recipient's willingness to change behaviour and to increase human capital. Simple simulations in not repeated and repeated contexts, with and without information extraction with inspections are developed to check if sensitive conclusion can be reached.
Outcomes suggest first to design policies in a more asset building-oriented setting and second to enforce game-repetition with inspections as a way to spread positive common knowledge among the recipients on the foreseeable future moves of the giver.
Changing giver's incentives and payoffs, could drive to more effective help toward individuals and families in dire times.

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